Abstract-Efficiency and security are two basic requirements for sensor network design. However, these requirements could be sharply contrary to each other in some scenarios. For example, innetwork data aggregation can significantly reduce communication overhead and thus has been adopted widely as a means to improve network efficiency; however, the adoption of in-network data aggregation may prevent data from being encrypted since it is a prerequisite for aggregation that data be accessible during forwarding. In this paper, we address this dilemma by proposing a family of secret perturbation-based schemes that can protect sensor data confidentiality without disrupting additive data aggregation. Extensive simulations are also conducted to evaluate the proposed schemes. The results show that our schemes provide confidentiality protection for both raw and aggregated data items with an overhead lower than that of existing related schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network [1] is an ad hoc collection of lowcost, small-size sensor nodes that can sense their direct environment and transmit their sensory data via wireless channels without requiring any infrastructure. Wireless sensor networks have become a popular platform for pervasive computing. For example, sensor networks may be deployed in factories, office buildings, hospitals and houses to monitor the working status of machineries, the air, light, noise, or temperature conditions of rooms, and the water and electricity consumption. Along with the attractive features and the increasingly important roles, sensor networks however have their inherent limitations: resource constraints, which is determined by the design goal of small-size and low-cost; security vulnerability, due to the open nature of wireless communication channels and the lack of physical protection of individual sensor nodes which makes ease the adversary to eavesdrop the communication and compromise sensor nodes.
Extensive research has been conducted to address these limitations by developing schemes that can improve resource efficiency and enhance security. Unfortunately, these two goals may not be achieved simultaneously and could even be sharply contrary to each other. A renowned example is the conflict between in-network data aggregation [2] - [6] and data confidentiality (privacy) protection. With in-network data aggregation, every sensor node processes multiple raw sensory data items that they produce, or that they receive and are expected to forward. Here, typical aggregation functions include SUM, AVERAGE, MAX/MIN, and so on [2] . After processing, only the aggregation result is transmitted. This way, the amount of data communicated in the network can be decreased, which consequently reduces the bandwidth consumption and the energy depletion for communication. However, to enable innetwork data aggregation, any sensor node should be able to see in plaintext every data item they forward. For this sake, sensory data must be either (i) transmitted in plaintext or (ii) encrypted with keys that known by the forwarding nodes. However, in case (i), data transmitted in plaintext can be eavesdropped by the adversary; in case (ii), data can be revealed if their forwarding node has been compromised by the adversary.
To deal with the aforementioned conflict between innetwork aggregation and data confidentiality, He et al. [7] recently proposed two pioneering privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes, namely, the cluster-based private data aggregation (CPDA) scheme and the slice-mix-aggregate (SMART) scheme, for additive aggregation functions. In CPDA, sensor nodes randomly form clusters, and sensor nodes within the same cluster collectively compute the aggregate value. Specifically, two rounds of interactions are required: first, each pair of sensor nodes in the same cluster exchange one data item derived from their own sensory data; second, each sensor node broadcasts, to other sensor nodes in the same cluster, another data item derived from the data it received in the previous round. In the improved SMART scheme, each sensor node only needs to exchange data for once with some nearest sensor nodes. Specifically, each sensor node slices its sensory data into a certain number (say, n) of pieces, and the pieces are then securely distributed to n − 1 nearest sensor nodes for aggregation. Both schemes can only tolerate up to a certain threshold number (i.e., the number of sensor nodes in a cluster minus two for CPDA, and the sum of outdegree and in-degree minus one for SMART) of sensor node or communication link compromises. Although the threshold can be raised by expanding the size of cluster for CPDA or increasing the number of slices for SMART, it will result in higher communication overhead.
In this paper, we revisit the challenging problem in a different perspective, and propose a new series of schemes for data confidentiality protection in additive data aggregation. Similar to the scheme proposed by Castelluccia et al. [8] , our schemes are built on the following basic idea of Secret Perturbation (SP): the sink shares a secret with each sensor node respectively; when a sensor node has a sensory data item to report, it does not report the original data, but the sum of the original data and the secret shared with the sink. This way, each reported data item is a perturbed version of the original data item. The perturbed data can be transmitted without encryption because eavesdroppers or other sensor nodes do not know the secret used in the perturbation and thus cannot discover the original data. For efficient design and implementation based on the above idea, we propose a series of SP-based schemes. Particularly, we propose a Fullyreporting SP-based (FSP) scheme, in which each sensor node is required to report its perturbed sensory data to the sink; all data are aggregated as being forwarded; upon receiving the aggregated data, the sink can simply subtract the sum of secrets from it to obtain the aggregation of the original data. This scheme, however, may not be efficient if not all sensor nodes have data to report. Obviously, requiring sensor nodes to report when they do not have any sensory data introduces extra communication overhead; on the other hand, if not all sensor nodes report, the sink needs to know which sensor nodes report and which do not, and this also incurs extra communication overhead. Therefore, it is important to find out the optimal reporting strategy that can minimize the system overhead. To this end, we propose an optimal adaptive SPbased (O-ASP) scheme. The O-ASP scheme works under the ideal assumption that every sensor node has the knowledge of the network-wide topology and the network-wide pattern of sensory data generation, and it has enough resource to compute an optimal solution. These are not true in practice. Hence, we further propose a distributed adaptive SP-based (D-ASP) scheme that allows sensor nodes to adaptively optimize their reporting strategy based only on their local knowledge and inter-node collaboration, with moderate computational complexity. Extensive simulations are conducted to compare our schemes and the existing SMART scheme. The results show that our schemes provide perfect confidentiality for both raw and aggregated data items with an overhead lower than that of existing related schemes.
Contributions Compared with CPDA and SMART schemes, we have the following major contributions: Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III elaborates our proposed schemes. Section IV reports the performance evaluation results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper. We consider a sensor network that consists of N stationary sensor nodes and a stationary sink (e.g., a base station). Each sensor node has a unique ID picked from { 1, · · · , N }, and the ID for the sink is 0. After deployment, all sensor nodes form clusters, each cluster has a cluster head, and all clusters further form a tree rooted at the sink. The distance between the heads of two neighboring clusters(cells) may be one or more hops. Note that numerous existing schemes [7] , [9] - [12] can be applied for the formation of clusters and the tree. The cluster-tree structure makes up a two-tier hierarchy that can facilitate data aggregation in the network. Specifically, sensor data are first aggregated at each cluster head, and the aggregate data are then further aggregated gradually as they are forwarded towards the root along the tree branches. We assume that the sink knows the tree structure and the membership of each cluster (i.e., which nodes are in which clusters). Each cluster head knows the topology and membership of its own cluster as well as its parent and child clusters on the tree, and other sensor nodes know their cluster heads. Note that the knowledge needed by cluster heads and ordinary sensor nodes can be obtained naturally when the cluster-tree structure is built. If the sensor nodes are manually deployed, it is trivial for the sink to know the network topology and membership; otherwise, cluster heads may report their local information to the sink after the establishment of the cluster-tree structure, and then the sink can combine all the information together to obtain the network topology and membership. The failures of sensor nodes may change the network topology and membership; we assume that the failed sensor nodes can be detected by their neighbors and be reported to the sink and related cluster heads. A failed cluster head can be replaced by a sensor node alive.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Network Assumptions
Each sensor node monitors its direct environment and can generate data. We assume that each sensor data item is an integer ranging from 0 to some upper bound U d . Note that, even some data (e.g., temperature) may not be integer in its original form. But these data can be transformed to integers. Furthermore, storing and transferring integers are generally more convenient and efficient.
Although our proposed schemes work for any sensor networks with general cluster-tree structure, in the following examples and experiments, we assume a simplified structured as depicted in Fig. 1 . Here, the sensor network is deployed in a square area, which is divided into n×n cells. The sensor nodes in each cell form a cluster. The sink is located at a corner of the field. The sink and all clusters form a tree rooted at the sink.
B. Security Assumptions and Design Goals
We assume that the sink is trustworthy while any sensor node could be compromised. After a sensor node is compromised, it may attack the network in various ways. Since this paper focuses on addressing the conflict between innetwork data aggregation and data confidentiality protection, we only consider the attack where outsiders or compromised sensor nodes eavesdrop sensor data, reveal the data they receive/forward to the adversary.
When designing confidentiality protection schemes, we aim to achieve the following goals.
• Data privacy: The data produced by each sensor node should be only known to itself.
• Data confidentiality: In addition to data privacy, partially or fully aggregated data should only be known by the sink.
• Efficiency: After the confidentiality protection schemes are introduced, the system overhead should be kept as small as possible.
III. PROPOSED SECRET PERTURBATION-BASED SCHEMES
In this section, we present a family of schemes for confidentiality protection in additive data aggregation, based on the idea of secret perturbation.
A. Basic Idea of Secret Perturbation
Similar to the scheme proposed by Castelluccia [8] , the basic idea of secret perturbation can be illustrated through the following simple process: Before deployment, each node u is preloaded with a secret, denoted as S u , which is exclusively shared with the sink. Later, in response to every query from the sink, node u does not reply its original sensory data, denoted as D u , but a perturbed version of the data, denoted aŝ D u = D u +S u . This way, as perturbed data are forwarded hopby-hop in the network towards the sink, additive aggregation functions can be performed on them while the original data are not exposed; also since the sink knows the perturbations used by individual sensor nodes, it can subtract the perturbations when it gets the aggregated perturbed data. The above approach, however, has not addressed the following issues:
(I1) Replay attacks. If D u is exposed to the adversary (Note that this could happen, for example, if node u has a compromised neighboring node v and their readings are similar.), S u is also revealed; thereafter, the perturbation is no longer effective. It is desired that the perturbation is not fixed; instead, different perturbations will be used for different data items. This way, exposing one data item will not compromise the confidentiality of other data items.
(I2) Capacity of confidentiality protection. If the range of S u is known by the adversary, the range of D u can also be derived. Specifically, assuming the lower and upper bounds of S u are respectively L s and U s , and recall that the lower and upper bounds of D u are respectively 0 and
The range could be small in some cases, for example, if U d = 1000, L s = 0, U s = 200, and D u = S u = 10,D u = 20, the adversary knows D u is between 0 and 20, which is already a small range. To address this issue, the desired perturbation method should guarantee that the perturbed valueD u does not reveal any information about the range of D u ; in other words, no matter whatD u is, the only range that the adversary can infer for
(I3) Efficiency. Generally speaking, for any query, some sensor nodes have sensory data satisfying the query while others do not have. Therefore, implementing the secret perturbation idea faces the following challenge: how the sink and individual sensor node interact appropriately to ensure that, the sink knows which sensor nodes have reported data and thus can correctly remove the perturbations brought by these sensor nodes. A straightforward solution to the problem could be requiring every reporting sensor node to also report its ID. However, this approach may bring a high extra overhead for forwarding a large number of node IDs, which cannot be aggregated as sensory data. Next, we will address these issues step by step.
B. BSP: A Basic Secret Perturbation-based Scheme
To show how to implement the idea of secret perturbation and at the same time address issues (I1) and (I2), we present a basic secret perturbation-based scheme which both protects data confidentiality and allows data aggregation.
1) Scheme Description: The scheme contains five components elaborated in the following, along with the explanation of the example shown in Fig. 2 . (A) System initialization. Given the maximum number of sensor nodes n and the range of each sensor data item {0, 1, · · · , U d }, the sink picks an integer L, a prime number q and a secure hash function hash(x) such that,
Then, the sink preloads each sensor node u with h(x) and two secret numbers denoted as S u,0 and S u,1 .
In our example, the number of sensor nodes N = 1024, U d = 65535, L = 16 and q = 65521. All these numbers satisfy the relations in Eq. (1). (B) Sending query at the sink. When the sink wants to query for some data, it sends out querying message query statement, R , where R is a random number that is different for different queries. -On receiving query statement, R , each node u establishes and initializes two variables (denoted aŝ D u andÂ u ) to 0, and a set (denoted as list u ) to empty. As shown later,D u and list u will be used to store perturbed sensor data item and the IDs of reporting nodes, respectively.Â u will be used to store an auxiliary data item that will be needed by the sink to derive the sum of original sensor data from perturbed sensor data. -If node u has a data item D u that satisfies the query, it performs the following steps to computeD u ,Â u and list u , respectively:
is a leaf node or it has no downstream node that will report data, the node will send out its data reporting message D u ,Â u , list u . In our example, node 7 is a leaf node which has original data item 23. Assuming hash(S 7,0 |R) = 65519 and hash(S 7,1 |R) = 64830, it computes the perturbed version of the data asD u as {23 + 65519} mod 65521 = 21, and obviously, list 7 = {7}. It also computes auxiliary A 7 = {23 + 65519} div 65521 = 1 and A 7 = {1 + 64830} mod 65521 = 64831. Finally, it sends out report 21, 64831, {7} . Similarly, node 12 is also a leaf node with original data item 26. 
This node performs the following steps to aggregate the above reports: 
It performs the steps in (D) to computeD 0 ,Â 0 and list 0 (Note that the ID of the sink is 0). Then, it performs the following steps to retrieve the sum of original data items. 
C. FSP: A Fully-reporting Secret Perturbation-based Scheme
Inspired by the fact that sensor data can be aggregated while node IDs cannot be aggregated, we propose FSP to avoid reporting node IDs. In this scheme, for every query disseminated by the sink, every sensor node must reply a perturbed actual or dummy data item, no matter the node has satisfying data or not. Because all sensor nodes reply, the IDs of reporting sensor nodes are not needed to be reported. After receiving data, the sink will simply subtract hash(S u,0 |R) for every sensor node u. Ideally, all nodes report their perturbed actual or dummy data to the sink. If some nodes fail and thus cannot report, their IDs certainly should be reported; in fact, this is also necessary for the purpose of network maintenance.
With FSP, no node IDs need to report. However, it requires all sensor nodes to report data no matter whether they have data satisfying the query. This may result in high extra communication overhead especially when only a small number of sensor nodes have data to report while most nodes do not. To overcome the aforementioned drawback in FSP, we next propose adaptive secret perturbation-based schemes, which can adaptively adjust the reporting behavior of individual sensor nodes to minimize the communication overhead.
D. O-ASP: An Optimal Adaptive Secret Perturbation-based Scheme
We design adaptive schemes aiming to answer the following question: For a query, how should every sensor node respond such that sensor data can be forwarded and aggregated along the way to the sink, and meanwhile the overall communication overhead is minimized? Note that the answer is not straightforward because each sensor node has multiple choices and determining which choice is the best is nontrivial.
O-ASP is designed based on an ideal and unrealistic assumption that each sensor node knows the membership and topology of the whole network and it knows whether each of these nodes has data satisfying each particular query (The assumption will be removed in the design of our decentralized online scheme, which is to be elaborated in Section III(D)) To explain the algorithm, let us first consider how to minimize the communication overhead within a single cell, and then we extend the scope and consider how to minimize the overhead within a tree containing multiple cells.
1) Minimizing Communication Overhead in a Single Cell:
We consider a cell whose ID is x (we call the cell C(x) thereafter). The number of nodes in the cell is denoted as n c (x), and n c (x) nodes have data to report. Further, we assume the distance from the cell head to the sink is h c (x, 0) hops and the distance from the cell x to cell y is h c (x, y) hops, l d (bits) is the length of the perturbed data (D u for node u) or perturbed auxiliary data (Â u for node u) reported by nodes, l n (bits) is the length of a sensor node ID, and l c (bits) is the length of a cell ID.
Regarding a query, nodes in the cell have following two options to choose:
• [All-reporting] If taking this choice, every node u will report its perturbed data (D u andÂ u ) no matter it has actual satisfying data to report or not. Consequently, the overall communication overhead is
where 2n c (x)l d is the overhead for all nodes to report data, and (2l d + l c )h c (x, 0) is the overhead for the cell head to report the cell-wide aggregated result and the cell ID, to the sink.
• [Non-redundant-reporting] With this option, each sensor node reports only when it has data satisfying the query. Therefore, the overhead for nodes to report their data and IDs to the cell head becomes 2n c (x)l d +n c (x)l n , and the overhead for the cell head to report cell-wide aggregated data and reporting node IDs counts to 0) . Therefore, the overall communication overhead is
Note that, a special case is there is no any node having actual data to report, and the overhead is l c h c (x, 0). The optimal solution for each sensor node in the cell is: if the result of Eq. (2) is less than that of Eq. (3), the all-reporting option should be chosen; otherwise, the nonredundant-reporting is preferable.
2) Minimizing Communication Overhead for a Multi-cell Tree: Let T (x) be a tree rooted at cell C(x), where x is the ID of the cell. In data aggregation, cell C(x) can take either the all-reporting or the non-redundant-reporting option. Let agg A [T (x)] represent the minimum cost for T (x) to aggregate data if C(x) takes the all-reporting option, and agg
, where c A [T (x)] is the cost for aggregating data to C(x) while other three stand for the costs for reporting the aggregated results to the sink: specifically, l 
T (x)] is also a 4-tuple l
. Therefore, if taking the all-reporting option, the overhead is (4) and if taking the non-redundant-reporting option, the overhead is To address this problem, we propose algorithm optAgg, which is formally described in Algorithm 1.
Taking the computation of agg
A [T (x)] as example, the basic idea of the algorithm is explained as follows. The algorithm contains the following steps:
• Computing the aggregation overhead in C(x). As shown in Eq. (2), the cost for aggregating data to the cell head is 2n c (x)l d , the length of aggregated data is 2l d , the length of aggregated cell IDs is l c (only one ID), and the length of aggregated node IDs is 0. All these become the initial values of c only C(x) , the computation stops. Otherwise, the current overhead will be adjusted by considering the subtrees rooted at the child cells of C(x).
• Adjusting the overhead by considering each subtree T (y)
rooted at each child cell C(y). We now consider two subcases:
/* C(y) taking all-reporting choice */ 5:
/* C(y) taking non-redundant-reporting choice */ 8: 
/* C(y) taking all-reporting choice */ 5: (x, y) . Therefore, the overall additional overhead for T (x) becomes
Note that, the length of data will not be added because, in our SP-based schemes the data length will not increase as more and more data are aggregated. In addition, the ID of C(y) needs not be reported is due to a technique that we used to reduce the overhead: if a cell takes the same aggregation option as its parent cell, it will not need to report; the sink will derive this out. Case II: C(y) taking the non-redundant-reporting option. In this case, the addition of overhead from T (y) includes: the cost for aggregating data in T (y) to C(y), i.e., 
After comparing Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), the less one will be added to the overhead of T (x).
E. D-ASP: The Distributed Adaptive Secret Perturbationbased (D-ASP) Scheme
Due to the unrealistic assumption of knowing global network membership and knowledge as well as whether each node has data to report, the O-ASP scheme is not feasible, though it can be used as a reference to compare with practical scheme. To overcome this problem, we propose the D-ASP scheme, which enables nodes to make decisions based only on their locally available information and all interactions only take place within a cell or between neighboring cells. The D-ASP scheme contains several algorithms designed for ordinary sensor nodes or cell heads:
1) The Algorithm for Ordinary Sensor Nodes: The detail of the algorithm is described as follows.
• On receiving a querying message query request statement, R : Each sensor node u that has data D u satisfying the query immediately sends the perturbed data (D u ) and auxiliary data (Â u ) to the cell head, while other nodes do not respond.
• On receiving a message all − reporting from the cell head: If sensor node u has not sent its data, it will send out its perturbed dummy data (i.e., hash(S u,0 |R)) and auxiliary data (i.e., hash(S u,1 |R)) to the cell head.
• On receiving a message non − redundant − reporting from the cell head: If sensor node u has already sent out its perturbed actual data (D u ), it will now send out its ID.
2) The Algorithm for Cell Heads:
The algorithm is formally described in Algorithm 2. The basic idea is as follows. On receiving a querying message query query statement, R , the head of each cell C(x) first starts a timer, which will fire when intra-cell nodes that have satisfying data to report should have done with reporting. Then, it waits, and records and aggregates reported data items.
If C(x) is a leaf cell (i.e., it has no any child cell), the head makes a decision on taking the all-reporting or nonredundant-reporting option based on the information it has already obtained. The approach is similar to Section III-D.1. Specifically, it computes the overhead for taking all-reporting, as in Eq. (2), and that for taking non-redundant-reporting, as in Eq. (3), and then chooses the one that has the less overhead. If it decides to take all-reporting, message all−reporting will be broadcast, and the ordinary nodes that have not reported data yet will now send out dummy reports. If it decides to take non-redundant-reporting, the head will report the cell-wide aggregated data along with the number of reporting nodes and its aggregation cost to its parent cell; after that, it will wait for the decision from the head of its parent cell. As to be described later, the head of its parent cell will make and send back the final decision. If the final decision is all-reporting, message all−reporting will be broadcast; otherwise, message non−redundant−reporting will be broadcast, and ordinary nodes that have sent out data before will respond by reporting their IDs.
For a cell C(x) that is not a leaf cell, its head makes the aggregation decision after it has received all reports from its children cells. Based on the information collected from its own cell and its child cells, the head estimates (i) the overhead of T (x) if C(x) takes the all-reporting option and (ii) the overhead of T (x) if C(x) takes the non-redundantreporting options, and decides on the one that has the less overhead. Note that during the course, it also makes decisions for its child cells that have temporarily decided on the nonredundant-reporting option. The decisions about its child cells will be sent back. As for the decision about its own cell, if it is all-reporting, the decision is executed immediately; otherwise, it will send its aggregated data to its parent cell, and the head of the parent cell makes the final decision for it.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our confidentiality protection schemes FSP, O-ASP, and D-ASP, and compare them with SMART and ORIGINAL 1 in terms of bandwidth consumption. We conduct extensive simulation to explore the impact of various parameters on the bandwidth consumption of these five schemes.
We assume that all the sensor nodes are uniformly deployed in a n × n square area, which contains n 2 cells. The sensor nodes in each cell form a cluster, and all the cluster heads form an aggregation tree as depicted in Fig. 1 . The distance between two cells is in range [1, 3] . In our simulation, n is set to 6 and the number of sensor nodes in each cell is set to 8 unless otherwise specified.
When the base station initiates a query request, it is very common that only a subset of the cells have data to report. Hence, we first study the performance of our proposed schemes, SMART, and ORIGINAL by changing the probability that a cell has data to report. Fig. 3 shows the bandwidth consumption of FSP, O-ASP, D-ASP, SMART and ORIGINAL at different probability values. As shown in Fig. 3 , for O-SAP, D-ASP, SMART, and ORIGINAL the bandwidth 1 The aggregation scheme without confidentiality protection.
consumption increases with the increase of the probability. For FSP, the bandwidth consumption does not change as the probability increases. The bandwidth consumption of FSP is always higher than that of O-ASP, and the performance of FSP is much worse when the probability of a cell reporting data is low. For example, the bandwidth consumption of FSP is almost three times higher than that of D-ASP when the probability of a cell generating data is 10%. This is because FSP requires all the sensor nodes to report data even though some of them have nothing to report. The sensor nodes with nothing to report will report zero plus the hash value of their secret key instead of keeping silent in order to allow the base station to correctly retrieve the aggregation result. O-ASP and D-ASP are designed to remove such unnecessary cost in FSP. The bandwidth consumption of D-ASP is very close to that of O-ASP-only 11% higher than that of O-ASP on average. The bandwidth consumption of O-ASP and D-ASP grows slower than that of SMART with the increasing of probability of reporting data per cell. This is because O-ASP and D-ASP avoid reporting the mote ID whenever possible, while in SMART every node has to report its mote ID. Hence, the larger is the percentage of data reporting cells, the more mote ID cost will be saved by our schemes. ORIGINAL has the lowest bandwidth consumption because it just reports the raw data but losts the protection of the data confidentiality and privacy.
We also study the performance of our schemes, SMART and ORIGINAL when 25% of the data generating cells are sparse cells and 75% of the date generating cells are dense cells. We conduct two sets of simulations in which the dense cells are distributed randomly and distributed adjacently, respectively. The result is similar to Fig. 3 .
Secondly, we study the impact of the number of motes that generate data in a cell on bandwidth consumption. Fig. 4 shows the bandwidth consumption of FSP, O-ASP, D-ASP, SMART, and ORIGINAL with different number of motes reporting data in each cell. As the number of reporting motes in each cell increases, the bandwidth consumption of O-ASP becomes closer to that of FSP. This is expected since the more the reporting nodes are, the fewer unnecessary zero reports are generated in FSP. When all the nodes in the network report data, the bandwidth consumption of FSP and O-ASP should be the same. The average bandwidth consumption of D-ASP is only 12% higher than that of O-ASP according to our simulation. Therefore, D-ASP provides a practical solution for confidentiality protection. Fig. 4 also shows that the bandwidth consumption of SMART becomes higher than that of FSP when more than 3 motes generate data in each cell. This can be explained as follows. Besides mote ID overhead, in SMART, each sensor node will slice its data into J pieces and send J −1 pieces to J −1 randomly selected h-hop neighbors. Thus, even though those neighbors do not have their own data to report, they will receive some data pieces from other neighbor nodes with very high probability and then report the received data, which leads to higher cost compared to our schemes.
Different applications have different data to collect. Some To evaluate the scalability of the five schemes, we study the impact of mote ID length on the bandwidth consumption of these schemes since the more nodes are in a sensor network, the longer the mote ID length is. The result is shown in Fig. 6 . It shows that while the bandwidth consumption of SMART grows quickly with the mote ID length, the bandwidth consumption of our schemes grows slowly with the mote ID We also study the bandwidth consumption of FSP, O-ASP, D-ASP, SMART, and ORIGINAL with different number of motes in each cell. In our simulation, the number of data reporting nodes is randomly set between 1 and K in each cell, where K is the number of nodes in each cell. The results are shown in Fig. 7 . The figure shows that as the number of motes increases, the bandwidth consumption of FSP increases much faster than that of O-ASP and D-ASP because of the unnecessary zero reports in FSP. Compared to SMART, D-ASP consumes less bandwidth when the number of motes in each cell increases up to 12, while O-ASP starts to consume less bandwidth when the number of motes increases up to 8. This is because in SMART when the number of motes increases, the involved motes without data generating will also increase.
In summary, our schemes D-ASP and O-ASP significantly outperform FSP in terms of bandwidth consumption and scalability under various simulation settings and in most cases our schemes are better than SMART. In addition, D-ASP performs almost as well as O-ASP while runs much faster than
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2008 proceedings.
O-ASP. Hence, D-ASP is a practical solution to confidentiality protection for data aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a family of secret perturbationbased schemes to protect the confidentiality of data in distributed aggregation. We first presented a basic scheme which employs the basic principle of module operations to achieve data confidentiality. Then, we proposed FSP, O-ASP and D-ASP to improve the communication performance. Extensive simulations have also been conducted to evaluate the proposed schemes. The results show that our schemes provide confidentiality protection for both raw and aggregated data items with an overhead lower than that of existing related schemes.
